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This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition 
model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman 
G., Helpman E. [1994], "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to 
include sanctions from the electorate and lobbies when the incumbent does not satisfy the 
expected performance she promised to deliver. This framework allows to deal with the 
intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, 
disappointment, new promises, new disappointment …. 
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Electoral control when policies are for sale 
 
1.  Introduction and background literature 
 
Is an electoral campaign a tool to pledge economic policies to come or to flatter voters by 
promising economic policies that may not be implemented? Another way to ask the question 
would be: does politics have to be disappointing? It is crystal clear that the answer to that is 
essential to maintaining legitimate democracies. Indeed, should politics be necessarily and 
systematically disappointing, then the tendency not to vote that exists in some democracies 
could develop to the point that politics would be determined by a small number of voters 
whose characteristics would be either altruism or instead belonging to lobbies that would be 
likely to strongly influence the economic policies implemented (in their best interest). 
 
In this article, we are studying, within the framework of electoral competition in the presence 
of  endogenous  lobbies,  the  dynamics  of  election  promises.  If  economic  policies  can  be 
influenced by  lobbies, then we must analyse the dynamics of the elected representatives’ 
promises and achievements. In return, the presence of the lobbies will be affected by the 
dynamics of promises and we integrate this endogenous constitution of lobbies in the analysis. 
Thus our study stands at the confluence of several interrelated literatures (see the synthesis by 
zones in figure 1). 
 
A first strand of the literature on endogenous economic policies can be characterized by the 
way  elections  are  taken  into  account,  or  not:  either,  starting  from  Peltzman  (1976)  and 
Hillman and Ursprung (1988), election is not explicitly taken into consideration, or, in the 
tradition of Brock and Magee (1978), electoral competition lies at the core of the political 
game. 
 
Another strand of the literature can be termed "the contribution approach", and it most often 
relies on  Grossman  and Helpman  (1994).  Their model has become the workhorse in this 
approach, notably when studying the political economy of trade. Its attraction comes notably 
from the fact that the model has clear-cut predictions on the relation between protection and 
the import penetration. This facilitates the empirical strategy, and has permitted to verify the 
empirical  relevance  of  the  approach,  as  was  for  example  demonstrated  by  Goldberg  and 
Maggi (1999), Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)
1, Mitra et al. (2002), Eicher and Osang 
(2002), McCalman (2004), Lopez and Matschke (2006). 
 
However, both the theory and its empirical validation have recently come under attack. The 
link between contributions received from lobbies and policies implemented by politicians has 
been questioned by, notably, Ansolobehere et al. (2003), while the empirical strategies have 
been  criticized  by  Mitra  et  al.  (2006)  and  Kee  et  al.  (2007).  [The  approach  through 
contributions,  which  doesn’t  take  the  election  into  consideration,  is  at  the  intersection  of 
zones B, C, D & E of figure 1.] 
 
 
                                                 
1 Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) show that, following the Grossman and Helpman model predictions, US 
protection is sold to lobbies. They show that the lobbies spending compensates the government from deadweight 
loss from protection and explain the low level of US protection as resulting from preferences of the government, 
placing similar weight on total net welfare relative to lobbying spending. They also show that in the case of rival 
lobbies, the competition increases the contributions and that lobbies spending clearly depends on the strength to 
their rivals.   3 





The main criticism to Grossman and Helpman’s approach (1994) is of ignoring the election 
process despite the lobbies’ role in the process
2. Looking at Ansolabehere et al. (2003) sheds 
light on the importance of this criticism. Trying to answer to an old question attributed to 
Tullock (1972) ("why is there so little money in US politics?"), the authors first consider that, 
given the value of policies at stake, interest groups should give more. Second, focusing on 
PAC contributions they show relatively few effects on voting behaviour. According to them, 
this could suggest that policies are not for sale. 
 
But two other explanations may rebute this statement. (1) Contributions especially target very 
specific policies (e.g. commercial protection for one industry), and then the ratio global value 
of policies / contributions is not a relevant way to assess the presence of money in politics. (2) 
Lobbies  want  to  affect  election  outcomes  rather  than  changing  position  of  politicians,  as 
Ansolabehere  et  al.  (2003)  themselves  state,  which  mean  that  the  best  analyzing  tool  is 
electoral competition.  
 
                                                 
2 Grossman and Helpman themselves consider (1994, p. 834) that the electoral competition model is better suited 
to the analysis of the trade policy major shaping whereas their model is more suitable for a detailed analysis (by 
sectors) of this policy.   4 
A third strand of the literature focuses on another limit, i.e. the strictly exogenous character of 
the lobbies. Most generally, lobbying is modelled as a "menu-auction" where exogenously-
constituted lobbies offer to politicians contribution schedules that are binding promises of 
payments, conditional on the chosen policy (see e.g. Bernhein and Winston 1986, Grossman 
and Helpman 1994). To get round this limit, some works have integrated endogenous lobbies 
(see for example Findlay and Wellisz 1982
3, or Felli and Merlo 2002
4). Implemented sectorial 
policies are then considered as a growing function of the contributions received. But then, part 
of the political game is often missing. [Those works are at the intersection of zones A, C, and 
E of figure 1.]  
 
More  importantly,  whatever  the  strand  of  the  literature  considered,  a  shortcoming  largely 
present in literature is the static framework of the political economic analysis. Relatively few 
works  situated  in  the  field  of  endogenous  protection  integrate  the  notion  of  time,  or  the 
dynamics of election promises. Cairns (1989), taking up Becker’s analysis (1983), studies the 
compared welfare effects of rent seeking in static and dynamic frameworks. Yet the analysis 
deals  only  with  the  lobby’s  side.  The  side  of  policies  demand  (voters)  is  not  taken  into 
consideration and the supply side (politicians) is considered as given. Moreover the election is 
not explicitly taken into consideration (in this case, the electorate is not a variable which 
justifies,  within  this  analysis  framework,  focusing  the  reflexion  on  the  role  of  lobbies). 
[Cairns’s analysis is at the intersection of zones B, C, and F of figure1.] 
 
In Banks (1990), time consideration does not translate into an intertemporal analysis since the 
model is a one-period one. The time aspect is only present as a background, justifying the cost 
of the lie: the author considers that the voters can sanction the candidates for their past lies 
(Banks 1990, p. 310). [Banks’ analysis is at the intersection of zones B, C, D & E of figure 1.] 
 
Ward (1993) integrates time in his analysis but in the background only: time is introduced 
only  to  link  the  finite  aspect  of  politicians’careers  to  the  difficulty  to  cooperate  at  the 
international level (Ward 1993, p. 230). [Ward's analysis is at the intersection of zones C & E 
of figure 1.] 
 
Wirl (1994) points out the weakness of the static analysis by asserting that the dynamic aspect 
of  lobbying  is  its  most  basic  characteristics.  The  author,  attempting  to  answer  the  same 
question  as  Ansolabehere  et  al.  (2003),  modelizes  lobbying  as  competition  between  two 
groups (farmers and consumers) in relation to the same criterion (political favour). The main 
conclusion of the analysis is that, in a dynamic framework, one lobby restricts its effort out of 
fear of reprisals from the other lobby. Yet the election is not taken into account (we are in 
effect in an analysis framework where lobbying is continuous, so the model can be static, and 
is de facto close to the one shown by Peltzman, 1976, in terms of regulation or of Grossman 
and Helpman’s, 1994)
5. [Wirl's analysis is at the intersection of zones B & E of figure 1.] 
                                                 
3 Findlay and Wellisz (1982) consider two lobbies (one protectionist and one supporting free trade), exerting 
contradictory pressures. The tariff is a function of the effort balance (i.e. resources invested in the political 
process) of the competing lobbies. The approach however stumbles on a mathematical impossibility: the shape 
of reaction curves of each group is not determined, forbidding knowing whether the balance is stable or even if it 
does exist. 
4  In  Felli  and  Merlo  (2002), the  incumbent  chooses  the  lobbies  participating  in  the  political  game.  So  the 
coalition of lobbies depends on the preferences of the incumbent (supposed to choose lobbies with different 
preferences to its own in order to maximise contributions). 
5  Besides,  the  hypothesis  according  to  which  consumers  organise  in  lobbies  (and  express  themselves 
independently from the electoral framework) is contradictory with what we know, since Olson (1966) notably, 
about the difficulty of collective action for large groups (as a matter of fact, the point is recognised by Wirl, 
1994, p. 308).   5 
 
The  corollary  of  the  static  analysis  is  that  the  phases  of  the  political  game  are  actually 
simultaneous.  Conversely,  in  an  intertemporal  framework,  nothing  prevents  a  separation 
between these phases. Thus the payment by the lobby of a contribution, the announcement 
and then the implementation of the policy by the political party do not occur at the same time. 
So it seems necessary to introduce the fact that the game phases are linked by the players’ 
commitments, relying particularly on trust or credibility. At that point an analysis of the lie in 
politics is becoming essential. 
 
Aragones et al. (2007) demonstrate that the most accurate perspective to analyze political 
games is the dynamic one
6. They make the hypothesis that when a candidate lies the electors 
punish her by never believing her future promises. This punishment for reneging is rather 
extreme (as the authors recognize) which can bias the results of the model. Such a bias is 
indeed recurrent in taking the political lie into account. 
 
Two  possibilities  are  competing  here.  Either  promises  are  binding,  and  the  policy  is 
determined at the time of the campaign (the lie is nil); or the promises are worthless, and the 
policy is actually determined after election (the lie is gratuitous). According to Persson and 
Tabellini (2000): "It is somewhat schizophrenic to study either extremes: where promises 
have no meaning or where they are all that matter. To bridge the two models is an important 
challenge".  
 
The model proposed in this paper is an attempt to get to this challenge
7, in that we make the 
original Grossman-Helpman model and reality closer, embedding the re-election constraint in 
the policymaker's reaction function, so as to take into account the fact that contributions may 
evolve in response to unsatisfied expectations from the incumbent. 
 
Other attempts have been made, of course, each with their own limitations. In Austen-Smith 
and Banks (1989), the incumbent's performance depends on her effort (a feature that is also 
present in this paper). They then show that, as voters exert a pressure on the incumbent to 
fulfil her promises, the incumbent has strong incentives to comply. 
 
Banks (1990) also considers electoral promises in a dynamic framework, but without linking 
the policies to the vested interests they may satisfy. The same limit applies to the models 
based,  e.g.,  on  the  frameworks  developed  by  Ferejohn  (1986)
8  or  Rogoff  (1990),  where 
electoral support is not taken into consideration. 
 
Aragones et al. (2007) show, in an infinite-horizon model, that politicians have an interest to 
keep their promises, so as to create a reputation towards voters playing trigger strategies. 
Harrington (1993) also studies political promises, but in a model where politicians pander 
promises to electoral beliefs, hence leading to the conclusion that candidates will have an 
interest in being truthful if they want to have a chance to be re-elected in the second electoral 
period of the model. 
                                                 
6 "If voters have rational expectations, no campaign promise can alter voters' beliefs about what action will be 
taken by a candidate if he is elected. If there were any statement that did alter beliefs in a way that increased the 
probability of election, the candidate would make such a statement (…) Hence no campaign statement can 
convey information that alters the chance of election. When we move from the case of a single election to 
multiple elections, campaign promises may be costly (…) in a repeated game" (Aragones et al., 2007). 
7  Another  attempt  is  due  to  Bennedsen  and  Feldmann  (2006),  where  lobbying  is  a  continuous  action,  but 
implemented without considering electoral deadlines. 
8 Ferejohn’s (1986) analysis relies notably on the divergence between politicians’annoncements and actions.   6 
 
Callander and Wilkie (2007) develop Banks’ model (1990) by putting political lies at the core 
of the analysis. At that point, they notably modelize gratuitous lies as specific cases of usually 
costly lies. Though a one-period model, their analysis is not far from ours. Yet, whereas we 
integrate lies and their consequences into the endogenous economic policy, Callander and 
Wilkie (2007) is more typical of the electoral competition approach (to which extent does 
politicians' ability to lie affect the likeliness of being elected?). [Those analyses lie at the 
intersection of zones B, C, D & E of figure 1.]  
 
At this point, it is probably useful to state what the main characteristics of our approach are, 
in  relation  of  these  different  strands  of  literature.  We  do  not  consider  a  homogenous 
electorate, and we integrate lobbies’actions aiming at getting specific policies favouring their 
own  interest.  Secondly,  we  focus  our  analysis  on  the  conditions  in  which  politicians  can 
disown their commitments, thus revealing, in our framework
9, the basic reasons for political 
lies as well as their consequences (re-election, time account). Thirdly, we are using a model 
close to the models presenting lobbying as an auction process, yet in our model the formation 
of lobbies is, at least to some extent, endogenous. Finally, our model is an intertemporal 
model of endogenous economic policies taking into consideration both the side of the supply 
and of the demand. Hence, though relying on a framework derived from the contributions 
approach,  the  paper  is  also  related  to  the  part  of  the  literature  that  deals  with  electoral 
competition and campaign promises. As a consequence, uncertainty is introduced as a central 
element of the process. Deception and its cost (neither nil nor infinite) will be determined 
endogenously by the model. Figure 1 shows where such an approach stands in relation to 
literature.  
 
The  article  is  structured  as  follows.  The  following  section  details  the  hypotheses  and 
microfoundations  of  the  model.  Section  3  exposes  and  solves  the  intertemporal  program, 
while in section 4 we derive the equilibrium of the game and discuss the results. The last 
section concludes and provides hints for further research. 
 
 




We are reformulating here the Grossman and Helpman’s model (typical of the Ricardo-Viner 
framework) while simplifying it and also generalizing it to tax policies as a whole. Individuals 
have identical additive utility functions in the shape: 
 
  ∑ + = ) ( i X Z t U U q q  
 
                                                 
9 Note that our approach, although focusing on time constraint and modifications of political behaviours is not an 
informational theory. That is we do not accept political contribution to be welfare improving. First, Browning 
(1974) considered the beneficial impact of lobbying through the transmission of information. Others, such as 
Baldwin (1982), Laband and Sophocleus (1988), Austen-Smith and Wright (1992), who present a model of 
informational lobbying accept that lobbies spending also has a positive impact on social welfare. See in the same 
stream Lagerlöf (2006).   7 
qZ is consumption of good Z, which serves as standard with a domestic and international price 
normalized to 1.  xi q  is the consumption of good  Xi  (i n =12 , ,..., ). 
 
The  utility  functions  are  differentiable,  rising  and  strictly  concave.  The  standard  good  is 
produced from labour only (a work unit produces a good unit). The other goods are produced 
each by labour and a specific factor. All prices are measured in accordance with the standard. 
The wage rate is then equal to 1. 
 
In the way of Ederington and Minier (2008), we extend Grossman and Helpman’s standard 
model so as to consider that the government exerts both trade policies (creating a gap between 
domestic and international prices) and production policies (creating a gap between production 
and consumption domestic prices). 
 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 , n t i P P P P =   is  the  vector  of  domestic  prices  of  non  standard  goods 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 , n t i p p p p =  is the vector of international prices of non standard goods. 
) ˆ ,..., ˆ , ˆ ( ˆ 2 1 , n t i r r r r =  is the vector of trade taxes (a tariff on imports or a subsidy for exports if 
superior to 1). 
) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ( ~
2 1 , n t i r r r r =  is the vector of taxes / subsidies for production (subsidies if superior to 
1). 
ri is the vector of tax policy, with  t i t i t i r r r , , ,
~ ˆ × = . So we have:  t i t i i t i r r P , , ,
~ ˆ × × =p  
 
We  consider  two  elections,  the  first  one  occurring  in  period  t.  Each  period  covers  the 
campaign before election, the election proper and the ensuing mandate
10. The election is run 
notably around real or anticipated economic competence
11. The competence is normalized to 
belong  to  the  [0;1]  interval.  It  corresponds  to  the  quality  of  the  answer  to  a  group’s 
expectations. Thus if none of a group’s expectations is satisfied, the elected representative’s 
competence will be perceived by the group members as equal to nought. 
 
The likeliness of an election depends, a priori, on promises made by the candidates and the 
contributions they received. At period t, we suppose that the probability to be elected in t, ρt, 
depends  on  contributions  only
12.  Indeed,  the  announcement  the  candidate  made  does  not 
match her programme exactly, it matches what the opinion knows of this programme. In this 
way a candidate who received no contribution will be unable to publicize her programme 
whereas for a candidate who received an almost infinite amount of contributions the likeliness 










r   
 
                                                 
10 Period t+1 starts at the end of the mandate of period t, at the beginning of the election campaign in which the 
government will seek re-election. 
11 For all that the model is not one of electoral prediction. Even if the probability of re-election is a growing 
function of the contributions received, we consider that the election proper depends on other parameters (some 
non random) that are not formalised here.  
12 Nevertheless this does not strictly mean that the election at period t does not depend on the population, but the 
part  of  the  likeliness  of  an  election  linked  to  the  population  at  the  first  period  corresponds  to  exogenous 
parameters (population’s preference, the candidate’s relative charactéristics, hazard).   8 
Taking the contributions into account leads one to distinguish two cases. 
 
 
Case 1. The policy announced to the lobbies is determined ex-ante according to the demands 
of industrial lobbies (typically: in competition with importations). Then the micro foundations 
are characteristic of the Grossman and Helpman’s framework.  
 
The consumer’s surplus is the variable chosen to appreciate the voters’welfare: 
 
∑ ∑ - =
i
t i i t i t i i
i
t t i t P d P P d U P S ) ( )) ( ( ) ( , , , ,  
∑ ∑ - =
i
t i t i i t i t i t i t i i
i
t t i t i t r d r r d U r S ) ( )) ( ( ) ( , , , , , , , , p p p p  
 
with di the individual demand in good i. 
 
The tax policy also determines the tax revenue (R). We write that  i Q  represents the produced 
domestic  quantity  of  good  Q,  and  N   represents  the  whole  population.  We  have  the  tax 
revenue per capita: 
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where  ) (
1
) ( , , , , , t i t i t i t i t i i r Q
N
r d p p -   represents  the  demand  minus  the  production,  i.e.the 
imports. A customs tariff exists when at least one factor of production specific in the industry 
is present. The tariff (subsidy) also determines the rent got from this factor of production. 
Given Pi i P ( ) the rent agreggate entailed by tariff (subsidy). 
 
The  general  welfare  (w )  is  the  summation  of  these  three  elements  to  which  we  add  the 
dotation in labour (l): 
 
) ( ) , ( ) ( ) , ( , , ∑ + + Õ + =
i
t t t t t t t i t i t t t t r S r R r l r
i p p p p w  
The lobbies’welfare is expressed as: 
 
)] ( ) , ( [ ) ( ) , ( ; ; ; ; ; ; t t t t t t t i i t i i t i i t i i t i i t t t i i r S r R r l r
L L L L L L p p c p p w + + Õ + = = = = = = =  
 
with  L i  the sector politically organized in the way of Grossman and Helpman.  l  represents 
the supply of labour,  P represents the productivity of the specific factor,  c  represents the 
part in the population of the lobby’s members, R represents the tax revenue, and S represents 
the consumer’s surplus. 
 
The lobbies want to maximize their welfare, net of the contributions given to the government, 
i.e. : 
,.) ( ) , ( , , , r C r V t i t i t i - = p w  
   9 
The contributions plan links an announced policy and contributions for each sector is: 
t i t i t i C , , , w f × = , with  [ ] 1 , 0 , Î t i f . 
 
Note  that,  globally  speaking,  the  lobby  offers  two  plans  of  contributions,  one  to  the 
government and one to the opposition. Yet, if the two candidates belong to different parties 
clearly  situated  on  either  side  of  the  political  stage,  at  least  in  terms  of  the  distribution 
criterion, then we can expect one of these contribution plans to be empty
13, which corresponds 
to  0 , = t i f . Then we can write the utility function of the lobby: 
 
( ) ) , ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , , , , , , , , , p p c f p f f r S r R r l V t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i + × - + P × - + × - =  
 
In the typical situation of a sector politically organised since it is in competition with imports, 
the function is rewritten
14:  
 
)) , ( ) ( ) 1 (( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , t i
l
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i r S r M r r l V p c f p f f + × - × - + P × - + × - =  
 
with Mi  the quantity of imported good i . 
 
The maximisation of the lobby’s objective function is: 
 
0 )) , ( ' ) ( ) ( ' ) 1 (( ) 1 ( ) , ( ' ) 1 ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
,
= + + - × - + P × - = t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i
t i
i r S r M r M r r
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V





and (by Hotelling's Lemma )
15 : 
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c + - -
= -   
 
This expression can be simplified. For one sector, the consumer’s surplus is: 
 
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , , , , , t i t i t i t i t i t t i t i P d P P d U P S - =  
 
The surplus is derived in relation to the price: 
 
                                                 
13 On this point see Coughlin (1986, p. 28), and the "redistributive reputations" each candidate is supposed to 
have.  Some  analyses  are  even  based  on  this  criterion:  Magee,  Brock  and  Young’s  hypothesis  (1989),  for 
example, is that there exist two lobbies, one allied to capital, one to labour. 
14 In this case  t i t i r r , , ˆ = . 







 ; with  i X the 
domestic quantity produced by sector i. 
   10 
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A unit of standard good (price equal to 1) is produced with a labour unit, we have : 
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which is the writing of the tariff announced to the lobbies and corresponds to the sectorial 




Case 2. The policy announced to the lobbies is totally determined within the framework of the 
intertemporal political game, according to re-election constraints. 
 
These two cases do not amount to antinomic approaches since the endogenous determination 
(second case) can include case 1 (with lesser precision) and extend to all types of lobbies – 
including non industrial ones. 
 
In the first case:  t i t i t i C , , , w f × = , with w  the lobby welfare (representative) and f  representing 
the lobby contribution plan. In the second case: 
a
t i t i y C c l , , = ,where c is the part, in the 
population, of the productive sectors organised in lobbies, l a positive parameter representing 
the lobbies’sensitivity to announcements (y
a) made by the candidate. 
 
                                                 
16 As in the original Grossman and Helpman (1994) paper, and its reformulation by Ederington and Minier 
(2008).   11 
We here consider that a lobby feels concerned only by the policy applied to the sector to 
which  it  belongs.  This  is  a  traditional  hypothesis  in  this  literature,  which  may  seem 
restrictive
17 but has been proved acceptable with regard to reality (Panagariya and Findlay 
1996, p. 269). 
 
 
2.2. The election phase  
 
At the next period (t+1), the outgoing candidate’s re-election will depend on the evolution of 
the contributions she will be capable to collect as support to her candidacy as well as on the 
evolution of social welfare. 
Note that the lobby’s characteristics are seen as purely static, whereas the incumbent’s is 
dynamic. This difference in treatment can be justified by the fact that policies being short-
lived,  the  capital  always  exerts  its  lobbying  activity  according  to  its  short-term  interests 
(Pecorino 1997, p. 92). Conversely, a political party life span can be considered infinite. 
 
The variation of the likeliness of the outgoing candidate (incumbent)’s election reads: 
 






+ + - = 1 1 1 1 t t t W C a a r  
 
with  [ ] 1 ; 0 Î a , depending on the proportion of the population working in politically organised 
sectors (like in Grossman and Helpman, 1994). 
 
The lobbies modify their contributions according to the gap between the candidate’s effective 
competence in their field (y, measuring the performance of sectorial policies implemented) 
and the previous annoncement that their interests or sectorial claims could be satisfied. (y
a): 
 
(3)  ( )
a
t y y C - =
·
+ m 1  
 
parameter m, positive, being the lobbies’s sensitivity to deception (this is how we will, from 
now  on,  call  a  gap  between  promises  and  achievements).  We  consider  a  lobby  as 
representative. This hypothesis may seem strong (with as a consequence a market power of 




For the population, the  variation of welfare depends on the  gap between the competence 
announced to the candidate (x
a) and the one effectively exerted (x)
19: 
 
(4)  ( )
a
t x x W - =
·
+ n 1  
 
                                                 
17  Verreydt  and  Waelbroeck  (1982)  give  the  example  of  the  iron  industry  whose  protection  search  can  be 
countered by the pressure of much iron-consuming industries (Verreydt and Waelbroeck 1982, p. 388). More 
globally speaking, see Grossman and Helpman (1994, p. 849), for a discussion of this hypothesis. 
18 To make this point clearer see for example Prat (2002, pp. 163-164), who constructs a multiple lobbies model 
of "nondirectly informative advertising". 
19 This formulation implies myopic voters, reacting with regard to deception. Such behaviour has received strong 
empirical foundations (see Hibbs, 2006).    12 
with parameter n, positive, being the voters’ sensitivity to deception. Any incumbent will be 
considered in a way all the harsher as he will have promised much. From now on, it will be 
supposed that x
a is fixed at the level which maximizes its effect but that it will not be equal to 
1 for all that.  Indeed the credibility of  a total competence announcement is weak. As an 
illustration, let’s quote the "deal with the Italians" suggested by Silvio Berlusconi during the 
May 2001 campaign, in which he pledged not to run again in 2006 if he had not fulfilled at 
least four out of his five main electoral promises. As our analysis goes, that told the voters: 
8 , 0 ³
a x . 
 
Let’s also note that from the dynamic point of view 
a x  will be variable depending on the 
candidates,  the  commitments  and  the  past  positions  influencing  the  credibility  of  the 
annoncements (for common assumptions on this point, see Aragones et al. 2007, or Callander 
and Wilkie 2007). 
 
From now on we suppose that the lobbies’sensitivity to deception is higher than the voters’ 
(m > n), lobbies being usually better informed (and having more incentive to be informed) 
than the population for stakes that concern them directly. Consequently they have a better 




3.  Equilibrium 
 
 
3.1. The programme 
 
The candidate will try to maximize both the probability of an election in the first period and 
her evolution in the second period. Her utility function reads




+ + = 1 t t t G r r  
 
Which she will try to maximize under the following constraints: 
 
(6a)  k t + > 2





+ £ + Y W C t t 1 1  
(6c)  ( ) y L x c - £ 1  
 
                                                 
20 Baron (1994) distinguishes between informed and non informed voters. The latter, contrary to the former, can 
be influenced by the campaign expenses. It is consistent to consider that these two types of voters coexist in the 
electorate. Conversely, concerning the lobbies, their members are linked by the defence of a well-defined shared 
individual interest; concerning this objective, around which their relations with politicians are organized, one 
cannot consider that the lobby members are non informed or susceptible to the government’s influence. 
21 To make reading easier, we omit the candidate’s actualisation rate, as taking it into account produces only 
intuitive extra results.   13 
The first constraint comes first and foremost for the candidate: indeed, in order to be reelected 
one  must  first  be  elected;  [ [ 2
1 , 0 Î k   represents  here  the  security  margin  desired  by  the 
candidate (who also shows a preference for the present)
22. The second constraint is the one of 
the  ressources  available  in  the  economy:  ceteris  paribus,  the  sum  of  the  increase  of 
contributions and of the increase in the population's welfare (expressed in the form of surplus) 
cannot be higher than the total growth of the economy (
·
Y ). Indeed, the more it will be yielded 
to the lobbies’ claims (whose counterparts are the contributions allotted to the candidates), the 




The last constraint imposed to the elected candidate is notably the one of the time she devotes 
to the welfare of the voters. The exercise of her competence, x, by the elected candidate 
depends on the time ( [ ] 1 ; 0 Î L ) she devotes to them. However this competence exerted for the 
benefit of the voters is limited by the competence exerted for the benefit of lobbies (y). Even 
if we consider that the definition of sectorial policies is not time consuming, since it only 
respects given commitments, there is no denying that any concession made to lobbies diverts 
productive resources which could have been employed in a more effective way in relation to 
voters. Depending on c, the proportion of global population that the lobby represents, the 
political effort will be more or less costly.  
 
In other words, if  ] ] 1 , 0 Î L  and  c  and y  ] [ 1 , 0 Î , the performance vis-a-vis the voters depends 
on the time the incumbent devotes and on the DUPs:  ] [ 1 , 0 Î x . This third constraint is easily 
explained if the four extreme cases of behaviour are studied: 
 
(i)  If L = 0, the incumbent doesn’t care about the voters at all: x = 0 ; 
(ii)  If L = 1 and y = 0, the whole effort is made in direction of the voters and the 
DUPs are absent : x = 1 ; 
(iii)  If 0 = c ,  there  are  no  lobbies,  the  effort  in  direction  of  the  voters  results 
directly in performance : x = L ; 
(iv)  Finally, a specific situation can be considered where a lobby represents the 
whole population, thus 1 = c . So the politicians doesn’t have to make efforts in 
direction of the electorate (which does not exist as such), there is no checking 
force and y must be equal to 1. The constraint generates x = 0. 
 
 
3.2. Solutions and interpretations 
 
In the first case (announces to the lobbies, y
a, determined ex-ante), the programme resolution 
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22 As parameter k does not influence the results, we will not consider it afterwards. 
23 Laband and Sophocleus’s (1988) analysis illustrates this constraint. The authors study the loss of welfare 
stemming from rent-seeking. Taking economic growth as the welfare criterion and the number of lawyers in 































In the second case, y
a is completely endogenous. The resolution is done in IR
3. We hereafter 
concentrate on this case as it is a more general one. 
 
The second term of the utility function takes into account, from equations (2), (3) and (4), the 
cost of lying. Here, the cost of lying is expressed in relation both with the electorate and the 
lobbies (considering deception vis-a-vis the lobbies is an innovative aspect of our approach). 
The cost of lying results in a diminution of the likeliness of re-election, which solves the all or 
nothing problematics in the sanction of lying in the polls
24. 
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Based on these expressions, three interesting results can be declined. First, y will always be 
superior  to  x.
25  In  other  words,  the  lobbies’  interests  are  better  served  than  those  of  the 
population considered as a whole. Beyond the traditional conditions of the lobbies’ efficiency 
(small size, concentration, specificity of the factors, etc.), this result justifies the rationality of 
being organised in lobbies: what would be the interest of collective action if it did not allow 
for advantages compared to the rest of the population?  
 
                                                 
24 As opposed for instance to Aragones et al. (2007) who suppose that the sanction of political lies is to be never 
believed again. 
25 For space reasons, detailed results are not provided here but an appendix where they are demonstrated is 
accessible on request to the authors.   15 
Second, the model verifies the Olsonian condition relative to the organisation of pressure 
groups  (cf.  Olson,  1966):  there  is  a  threshold,c ~,  to  a  lobby’s  size  (represented  by  the 
proportion of the population belonging to the group), such that, under the threshold when the 
lobbies’size increases, so does the candidate’s effort in their favour
26. In this case the small 
size condition is fulfilled and allows the lobbies to be efficient. When their size increases the 
candidate  pays  them  more  attention  (depending  on  the  economic  “weight”  represented)
27. 
This threshold, though differently expressed and emerging differently, can also be found in 
Magee  (2002).  Hence,  in  our  setting,  lobbie's  formation  can  be  considered  as  partly 
endogenous.
28 Conversely, beyond this threshold, the lobbies are too important and they lose 




Third,  it  appears,  logically,  that  when  the  candidate’s  workload  increases,  the  policy 
implemented  first  deals  with  the  population’s  welfare,  any  extra  work  being  done  to  the 










). This point illustrates clearly 
the antagonism between the lobbies and the population which is also the opposition between 
vested interests and general interest.  
 
 
4.  The dynamics of electoral promises  
 
As defined above, the word deception expresses the gap between the candidate’s promises 
and her achievements, whether to the population as a whole or to the lobbies. In this section, 
we  show  the  conditions  on  which  the  electoral  candidates  can  make  promises  without 
fulfilling,  once  they  have  been  elected,  the  contract  made  with  the  voters  and  political 
supporters  during  the  campaign.  First  we  analyse  the  impact  of  promises  on  the  policies 
implemented, then the impact of the agents’ reactions to deception, finally the very dynamics 
of deception. 
 
                                                 
26 This means that the Olsonian condition, rather than a traditional postulate, is endogenous to the model. 
27 The small size is the main microeconomic condition for the constitution of a lobby. In all the literature relative 
to lobbying, a near consensus has been agreed around this point. Which is what allows Wellisz and Wilson 
(1986, p. 367, p. 372) to write that a group can meet its objectives even though it doesn’t have any other 
advantage than its small size ; for a similar reasoning see also Becker (1983, p. 385 and p. 395). From a rather 
macroeconomic point of view, Olson (1982) considers that stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to 
generate more organizations for collective actions. A recent study by Coates, Heckleman and Wilson (2007) 
confirms Olson's  view: socioeconomic development and  nations' stability (captured through proxies as time 
since initial take off date, last institutional upheaval and last violent turmoil) are key factors to explain group 
formation. 
28 Magee presents a model on endogenous trade policy and lobby formation focusing on the interactions between 
an incumbent and a single lobby. The cost for a member of the lobby to free ride is supposed to be an infinite 
reversion to the noncooperative solution. In this framework it is shown that increasing the number of the member 
of  the  group  generates  a  free-rider  problem  only  when  the  number  of  firms  (endogenously  determined)  is 
sufficiently large (Magee, 2002, p. 457 and p. 467). 
29 The lobby not being efficient any more in its rent seeking activity, the political support of its members is 
expressed through the vote (like big size groups such as trade-unions or consumers’unions).   16 
In the first place, we consider the sensitivity of the policies implemented in relation to the 





. So the policies led vis-a-vis the 
population are all the weaker as the promises were important. This a priori paradoxical result 
is  an  important  contribution  of  this  paper,  the  explanation  of  which  stems  from  the  time 
separation between promises and achievements that our model allows to highlight. In fact, the 
higher the promises, the less accessible. Rather than trying to reduce the gap later, it gets less 
costly for the political decision-maker to seek political support from the lobbies (besides we 





). This situation is notably linked to the (realistic) hypothesis of the voters’ 
inferior sensitivity to deception (m > n, cf. Baron, 1994). This result is confirmed by the 















The commitments to lobbies are endogenous, so one can not apply the same analysis as for 
promises made to voters. Yet it is possible to study the impact on the policies implemented of 





,  which  can  be 
interpreted  as  follows:  when  the  lobbies’sensitivity  to  announcements  increases,  all 
contributions unchanged, the announcements can decrease; from then on, deception being 





 testifies to the 
antagonism between the lobbies and the population. 
 
Second, we analyse the impact of sensitivity to deception on the policies led in the direction 
of the two types of agents the candidates are related to (i.e. the lobbies and the population). 







In other words, if the lobbies verify the Olsonian condition of political efficiency (cf. supra), 
then the candidates will tend to try to satisfy them all the more so as the lobbies will be 
sensitive to the gap between the announcements and the efforts really made. So, relatively 
small lobbies will tend all the more to contribute to the candidates’campaign efforts (another 
form of the condition of efficiency linked to a small size).   17 
On  the  other  hand,  except  if  the  work  done  by  the  candidates  is  close  to  nought,  the 
competence exerted by the candidates, once elected, will react positively to the electorate’s 





 for L different from nought






 when L tends to nought. This result can be understood intuitively if we reason a 
contrario: let’s imagine that the government works very little for the population even though 
the population’s characteristics do not interfere with the decisions they make (in the model 
terms: with the competence they exert) once in power. As a corollary, given the constraint 
(6c), we can remark that if the government strongly favours the lobbies as compared to the 
population, then it is likely that the competence exerted will have no regard whatever for the 
population.                     
                         
Third and last, we consider the results relative to the deception undergone by the agents. The 
deception vis-a-vis the agents reads like the gap between what was promised and what is 
implemented, for the voters  x x T
a - º , and for the lobbies  y y T
a - º
~
. The analysis will be 
based on the elasticities, which allows a comparison of the variations and makes the results 
more directly interpretable.                        
 













the relation between work increase and deception decrease is only valid if the government 








. So deception vis-a-vis the 
lobbies tends to increase when their political efficiency decreases (see the threshold relative to 
the  Olsonian  condition  above).  The  larger  part  of  the  economy  they  represent,  the  less 
efficient they are. Besides, it can be noticed that the more sensitive to the announcements the 








as to take in a maximum amount of contributions from a relatively not reluctant political 
support. 
 
A second interesting result concerning deception with regard to the lobbies is that, when the 










note  that  these  two  results  are  complementary  rather  than  contradictory,  as  the 
lobbies’sensitivity to deception can counterbalance their sensitivity to announcements. 
                                                 










31  Let’s  note  that  the  lobbies’sensitivity  to  deception  has  no  impact  on  deception  vis-a-vis  the  voters 






), which maintains margins of manœuvre fot the decision-maker. It’s actually the contrary for the 
population,  in  relation  to  which  deception  decreases  when  its  sensitivity  to  deception  increases.  Here’s  the 
explanation:  when  the  candidate  is  under  constraint  from  a  population  more  sensitive  to  deception,  which 
restricts the most "unachievable" promises, margins of manœuvre appear on the lobbies’ side, which allows her 
to receive extra contributions.   18 
 







L L > , which means that when the government works at least a minimum for the population, 
it deceives them less when they become more sensitive to deception (the disciplining device is 
valid  only  if  the  incumbent  does  not  rely  entirely  on  the  lobbies).  For  the  lobbies,  the 










 is the exact opposite of the previous one (thus, when you must 
deceive the population less, the lobbies are mechanically penalised for it: deception against 
them increases). By way of consequence, we also find that the higher the announcements (x
a) 
the more deceived the population (the more you promise the less you keep). A final result 
















& , which can 
be interpreted as : when growth improves you deceive the population more and the lobbies 
less.  Consequently  the  lobbies  are  the  winners  of  growth;  vis-a-vis  the  ressource,  the 
antagonism between vested and general interest clearly appears again. This result is also a 
novation of this paper, as it can not appear in a static framework. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This article offers a framework for analysing the dynamics of election promises, focusing on 
deception vis-a-vis voters and lobbies. This dual deception is an innovative aspect in the 
literature on lobbying. Global and sectorial policies (for the population and for the lobbies) 
maximize  the  politician’s  objective  function  at  different  levels.  In  equilibrium,  the  policy 
directed  to  the  lobbies  will  always  be  more  favourable  than  the  policy  directed  to  the 
population. Thus the lobbies appears as the winner of the political game. 
 
This global result must not hide the nuances that the two-period model adds to the more 
traditional vision of the political-economic interactions characteristic of the endogenousness 
of economic policies. 
 
 
The model presented offers a complementary vision of the Olsonian condition. According to 
that  condition,  a  lobby’s  political  efficiency  is  inversely  proportional  to  its  size.  This 
condition,  almost  unanimously  accepted  in  the  literature,  makes  of  a  small  size  the  main 
condition for a lobby’s constitution. 
 
In  the  model,  the  lobby  is  characterised  by  the  proportion  of  global  population  that  it 
represents. In consequence, when this proportion increases the lobby becomes less efficient. 
But this applies as far as the lobby carries the basic characteristics of a lobby, i.e. as long as 
this proportion is small. Thus, from a certain level, the group considered does not act as a 
lobby any longer; its political strength appears in a different way (votes, opinion polls, i.e. 
like the rest of the population
32). 
 
                                                 
32 By example if we consider that the lobby represents almost all the population, its influence will be only 
considered in a uniquely electoral perspective. 
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Consequently, the incumbent will only take the lobby’s characteristics into account if the 
condition of political efficiency is fulfilled. Thus a policy in favour of the lobby will depend 
positively on its sensitivity to deception only if the group is under a given size (the difference 
between potential and active lobby on which the endogenous nature of lobbying is founded in 
the model can be found here again). 
   
At the level of the electorate the characteristics are stable. But for the incumbent to take these 
characteristics  into  account,  she  needs  first  to  have  a  minimum  interest  in  the  electorate 
(which translates into a level of minimum effort in favour of the population). It’s from this 
threshold  of  effort  that  the  sensitivity  of  the  electorate  to  deception  will  be  taken  into 
consideration. So beyond this threshold, an increase of the sensitivity to deception improves 
the policy implemented for the population, and in the same condition this policy depends 
positively on the time devoted by the incumbent to the population. 
   
The sensitivity to announcements clearly highlights the antagonistic interest of lobbies and 
population.  The  more  sensitive  to  announcements  the  lobby’s  contributions  are,  the  more 
deceived it is (and the less deceived the population is) whereas the more announcements of a 
favourable policy are made to the population, the more it is deceived (and the less the lobby): 
the more you promise the less you keep. 
 
But the analysis also highlights the conditions on which deception can be exerted. From these, 
it can be shown that really utopian promises do not pay. Indeed, in the model framework, the 
lobbies’sensitivity to deception counterbalances their sensitivity to announcements, creating a 
disciplining device for the decision-maker. 
 
The antagonism shows particularly clearly concerning the ressource. When the growth of 
global wealth increases, the policy in favour of the population deteriorates whereas the action 
in favour of the lobbies improves. The more resources you have, the more beneficial to the 
lobbies the redistribution. 
 
It’s the same for deception: when the global wealth increases, deception vis-a-vis the voters 
grows and deception vis-a-vis the lobby decreases. This result can be linked to the fact that 
the economic growth (assessed in different forms) is one of the main variables of political 
support. Thus, the better the growth gets, the more likely to be re-elected the incumbent will 
be; this re-election going along with a growing closeness, as the election cycles go by, to the 
lobbies (more favours, less deception). It is then logical for the lobbies to prefer that the 
incumbent keep her position. A lobby’s influence on the likeliness of election can notably 
explain why incumbents get as an average more contributions than their contenders. 
 
This difference in contributions is demonstrated by tests done on the US Congress elections 
(Stratmann 1995, p. 132). This demonstration is questionable as it is contradictory with the 
approach  of  electoral  competition  since  it  implies  that  the  incumbents  can  change  their 
stances to get them closer to their contributors (Mueller and Stratmann 1994, p. 65). Our 
analysis shows how this ''rapprochement'' is actually endogenous itself. 
 
For future research it seems promising to distinguish between two voters’ groups (informed 
and non informed) and  make their respective parts endogenous according to deception (a 
deceived  voter  tending  to  be  more  informed)  for  elections  to  come  and  to  analyse  the 
consequences on the model equilibrium values. 
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